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Oppenheim: Don't You Know That You're Toxic? CERCLA Section 113(H) Challenge

DON’T YOU KNOW THAT YOU’RE TOXIC?
CERCLA SECTION 113(H) CHALLENGES, SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY, AND PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES IN
PENNSYLVANIA DRINKING WATER IN GIOVANNI V. NAVY
I. IT’S

IT’S ALL AROUND: AN INTRODUCTION
PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCE CONTAMINATION

IN THE

SOIL

AND

TO

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are groups of manufactured chemicals that have been used in the production of various consumer and industrial products worldwide.1 The two most
extensively-produced and well-researched forms of PFAS are perfluorooctane sulfonates (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid
(PFOA).2 Although the United States has produced PFAS since the
1940s, they were recently discovered to cause adverse human health
effects.3 Specifically, exposure to some PFAS — especially PFOS
and PFOA — can cause reproductive and developmental issues,
kidney and liver complications, cancers, thyroid hormone disruptions, and immunological effects.4 Until 2006, PFAS were used domestically in food packaging containers, commercial household
products, and industrial workplace products.5 While most PFAS are
now banned from being manufactured in the United States as a
result of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) PFOA Stewardship Program, other countries are still permitted to manufacture and export PFAS products to the United States.6
Currently, United States airports and military bases that use
firefighting foams are the main sources of PFAS emissions and contamination.7 PFOS and PFOA are especially known to permeate
soil, thus contaminating both drinking water and the water used to
1. Basic Information on PFAS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
pfas/basic-information-pfas (last visited Dec. 2, 2020) (summarizing general information on PFAS).
2. Id. (identifying chemicals qualifying as PFAS).
3. Id. (summarizing PFAS history and adverse health effects).
4. Id. (exemplifying adverse health complications from PFAS exposure).
5. Id. (describing PFAS usage).
6. See Risk Management for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) under TSCA,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/risk-management-and-polyfluoroalkyl-substances-pfas#tab-3 (last
visited Sept. 6, 2020) (summarizing 2006 call on eight major PFAS manufacturers
to work towards eliminating chemicals from emissions and products by 2015).
7. See Basic Information on PFAS, supra note 1 (explaining firefighting foams’
common use).

(255)
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grow food.8 As more manufacturing sites, airports, and military bases test their soil and drinking water, the link becomes more apparent between PFAS-contaminated soil and adverse effects on
residents’ health.9 Since 1999, federal health officials have tested
for PFAS in the blood serum of participants exposed to known
PFAS-contaminated sites to identify adverse health effects and further develop medical treatments for those negatively affected by
PFAS.10 In Giovanni v. United States Department of Navy,11 residents
of the nearby Willow Grove Air Reserve Station — concerned for
the safety of their children — brought suit to address these potential adverse health effects.12
This Note discusses the permissive and prohibitive impacts of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) Section 113(h) with respect to: bringing
hazardous waste claims, the limitations of existing state law pertaining to hazardous substances, and the role of judicial activism in environmental law.13 Section II of this Note provides a brief overview
of the facts and long procedural history leading up to the complaint in Giovanni, as well as the current status of the case.14 Section III provides the relevant precedent behind the case, including
the regulatory provisions, federal and state statutes, and binding
case law.15 Section IV looks to the Third Circuit’s legal analysis of
the case.16 Section V first breaks down the Third Circuit’s analysis
to determine whether the court correctly applied the binding pre8. Id. (explaining PFAS contamination process).
9. See EPA Announces Proposed Decision to Regulate PFOA and PFOS in Drinking
Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-proposed-decision-regulate-pfoa-and-pfos-drinking-water (last visited Sept.
6, 2020) (explaining increased testing procedures and public health risks).
10. See Per- and Polyfluorinated Substances (PFAS) Factsheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/PFAS_Fact
Sheet.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2020) (explaining overview of PFAS testing in
U.S.); see also Frank Kummer, PFAS testing planned for 1,300 adults, children in Bucks,
Montgomery Counties, THE PHILA. INQUIRER (July 10, 2020), https://
www.inquirer.com/health/pfas-bucks-county-montgomery-county-epa-cdc-pennsyl
vania-health-department-20200710.html (summarizing planned test of PA residents in PFAS-contaminated areas).
11. 906 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2018) (introducing subject case of this Note).
12. Id. at 99-100 (introducing case facts).
13. For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 100-52 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the procedural history and facts of Giovanni, see infra
notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the relevant regulatory and statutory background, see
infra notes 42-99 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 100-52 and
accompanying text.
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cedent.17 The second portion of Section V considers the value of
the concurrence’s approach.18 Finally, Section VI discusses the impact of the Third Circuit’s holding in Giovanni, both federally and
in the state of Pennsylvania.19 Section VI also highlights changes to
Pennsylvania environmental regulations regarding hazardous substances, as well as the EPA’s proposed rule concerning PFAS.20
II. SLOWLY, IT’S TAKING OVER: FACTS

OF

GIOVANNI V. NAVY

In 1995, the EPA listed Willow Grove on the National Priorities
List (NPL) for failing to comport with national health standards.21
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act provided for the
closure of Willow Grove in 2005, and all naval flight operations finally ceased in 2011.22 Among the environmental concerns plaguing Willow Grove are its two major base landfills, hazardous waste
storage areas, and groundwater and soil contamination from nonPFAS chemical substances.23 The Navy and National Guard assisted
the EPA and led Willow Grove’s cleanup efforts.24 The EPA, Navy,
and National Guard have rectified one base site’s soil contamination issue since 1995, but all other cleanup efforts at Willow Grove
are deemed ongoing.25
The EPA tested Willow Grove’s nearby water supply in 2014
and found dangerous levels of PFAS, including PFOA and PFOS.26
In 2016, the Giovanni family sued the Navy in the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas under Pennsylvania’s Hazardous
Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA) after learning that contamination of the
water supply and soil put local residents at risk of various health
17. For a critical discussion of the Third Circuit rationale, see infra notes 15373 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical discussion of the concurrence’s approach, see infra notes
154-67 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of the case, see infra notes 174-203 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of Giovanni’s impact on Pennsylvania law and regulations,
see infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
21. See Willow Grove Naval Air and Air Reserve Station Cleanup Activities, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY – SUPERFUND SITE, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/Site
Profiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=second.cleanup&id=0303820 (last visited Sept. 6,
2020) (summarizing Willow Grove’s environmental profile and EPA’s steps to improve environmental concerns). For a discussion of the NPL, see infra notes 47-55
and accompanying text.
22. Id. (providing timeline of Naval Station’s closure).
23. Id. (describing Naval Station’s other environmental concerns).
24. Id. (noting federal actors responsible for overseeing cleanup).
25. See Willow Grove Naval Air and Air Reserve Station Cleanup Activities, supra
note 21 (summarizing site milestones and progress updates).
26. Id. (describing soil and water testing process).
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problems.27 The Palmer family simultaneously filed suit against the
Navy in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.28 The Navy
properly removed both cases to the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.29
The district court held that the Giovannis’ action interfered
with Willow Grove’s ongoing cleanup efforts under Section 113(h)
of CERCLA and dismissed the action under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction.30 In a footnote to its Giovanni opinion, the district
court dismissed the Palmers’ case for the same reason.31
Both the Giovannis and Palmers filed timely appeals to the
Third Circuit.32 The Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Toxics Action
Center, and various local congresspersons and community members also filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs.33 On October 2, 2018, the Third Circuit affirmed in part, and vacated and
remanded in part, the district court’s dismissal of the complaints.34
The Third Circuit held that the request for a government-led
health assessment or health effects study constituted a challenge to
ongoing cleanup efforts, and was therefore barred by CERCLA Section 113(h).35 The EPA’s cleanup efforts were authorized under
CERCLA because Willow Grove had been listed on the NPL since
1995 and its cleanup efforts are classified as ongoing.36
CERCLA Section 113(h) does not bar private party medical
monitoring, however, because it is not deemed to be a challenge to
the ongoing cleanup efforts.37 In addition, the claim for medical
monitoring under the HSCA was injunctive relief and thus restricted the Navy’s sovereign immunity claim.38 The Third Circuit
27. Giovanni v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 906 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2018) (introducing facts of first lower court case where plaintiffs alleged harm from PFAS-contaminated water sources due to Navy’s improper disposal of hazardous substances).
The plaintiffs requested relief for impacted residents’ medical monitoring and
blood testing. Id. (noting remedy sought by plaintiffs).
28. Id. at 98-99 (introducing Palmers’ lawsuit).
29. Id. at 100-01 (describing removal process); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1)(1969) (stating cases are properly removed to federal district court
when federal agency is sued).
30. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 101 (describing lower court’s dismissal).
31. Id. (noting lower court’s dismissal of Palmers’ complaint).
32. Id. (describing plaintiffs’ appeal).
33. Id. (highlighting amicus briefs filed in support of plaintiffs).
34. Id. at 121 (summarizing Third Circuit’s holding).
35. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 102-06 (explaining why health assessments constitute challenge).
36. Id. at 99-100 (noting NPL’s relevance and EPA’s cleanup efforts).
37. Id. at 112 (distinguishing medical monitoring from health assessments).
38. Id. at 117-21 (explaining distinction between monetary and injunctive relief regarding sovereign immunity).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol32/iss2/5

4

Oppenheim: Don't You Know That You're Toxic? CERCLA Section 113(H) Challenge

PENNSYLVANIA DRINKING WATER

259

subsequently vacated the two latter claims and remanded them to
the district court.39
On January 15, 2020, the district court held on remand that
the Third Circuit properly determined the Navy had waived sovereign immunity pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).40 Judge Pappert also held that under
Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, PFAS did not constitute a hazardous substance at that point, and the court was limited
to the current laws of the state.41
III. A TASTE

OF

POISON PARADISE: A REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK

AND

STATUTORY

In order to address the court’s analysis in Giovanni, context
must be established through the relevant regulations involved, the
implicated federal statutes, the pertinent case law, and the basis in
Pennsylvania law.42 This section begins with an explanation of the
origin of the EPA and provides a brief overview of the NPL.43 This
section also provides an overview of CERCLA, as well as a more indepth summary of Section 113(h) interpreted through the relevant
case law.44 Next, this section covers RCRA and the EPA’s authority
to control hazardous waste.45 Lastly, this section concludes with a
discussion of Section 1115 of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act, explaining the right to a private cause of action from
hazardous waste exposure in Pennsylvania.46
A. EPA’s Regulatory Authority
In 1970, President Nixon proposed the creation of the EPA in
response to increased public concern for protecting the environ39. Id. at 121 (summarizing Third Circuit’s holding).
40. Giovanni v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 433 F. Supp. 3d 736, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2020)
(summarizing holding on remand).
41. Id. (explaining Court’s duty in deciding cases based on current law as
opposed to prospective law).
42. For a discussion of the legislative and regulatory background to Giovanni,
see infra notes 42-99 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of the history of the EPA and its authority, see infra notes
47-55 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of CERCLA generally and Section 113(h), see infra notes
58-89 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the RCRA and EPA authority to control hazardous
waste, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania HSCA and private actions, see infra
notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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ment from air and water pollution disasters.47 When Congress approved the creation of the Agency and its designated regulatory
authority, the federal government’s environmental responsibilities
were consolidated into the EPA, including a specific budget allocated to addressing these persistent environmental concerns.48
One of the EPA’s main responsibilities is maintaining the NPL,
which is a publicly-available list that guides the EPA’s cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.49 The NPL currently lists over one thousand
sites throughout the United States where hazardous substances are
present, or where the release of hazardous substances is
threatened.50 Placing a site on the NPL gives the EPA the authority
to begin a long-term remedial response action, which includes investigating, testing, and conducting cleanup efforts on sites where
there is a serious threat to human health or the environment.51
The EPA has issued health advisories for PFOS and PFOA, but has
yet to establish an enforceable Maximum Contaminant Level or
other regulatory determination nationally prohibiting the use of
PFOS or PFOA.52 As more is discovered about PFAS and their adverse health effects, the EPA continues to evaluate and add sites to
the NPL.53 On February 20, 2020, the EPA issued a news release as
part of their PFAS Action Plan to implement regulatory determina-

47. See The Origins of EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
history/origins-epa (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (summarizing EPA’s creation
history).
48. Id. (laying out EPA’s role authorized by Congress).
49. See Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list-npl (last visited
Sept. 7, 2020) (summarizing NPL, listing number of sites on NPL, listing status of
sites); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (giving authority to EPA to maintain current list of
sites).
50. See id. (listing sites currently on NPL).
51. See Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (discussing NCP and EPA’s role in addressing hazardous waste sites).
52. See PFAS Laws and Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/pfas/pfas-laws-and-regulations (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (explaining
EPA’s lack of authority in regulatory determination process and difficulties setting
MCLs for PFAS because of lack of regulation around PFAS); see also National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ground-water-and-drinking-water/national-primary-drinking-water-regulations
(last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (defining Maximum Contaminant Level as highest level
of contaminant allowed in drinking water).
53. EPA Actions to Address PFAS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/pfas/epa-actions-address-pfas (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (discussing
timeline of actions EPA has taken to address PFAS).
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tions for PFOS and PFOA.54 This news release established a plan
for (1) banning manufacturing and importation of PFAS, (2) implementing new testing procedures, and (3) issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking to add PFOS and PFOA to the Contaminant
Candidate List.55
B. Federal Statutes for Hazardous Waste
This subsection breaks down the various federal statutes primarily responsible for the control and management of hazardous
waste.56 The three statutes discussed in this section are (1) CERCLA Section 9601 et seq., as a broad overview of the intent and history behind legislation to control hazardous waste sites; (2)
CERCLA Section 113(h), which is the specific “timing of review”
that prohibits private actions that cause a challenge to the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites; and (3) RCRA Section 6961(a), which
waives sovereign immunity for claims for injunctive relief typically
seen in mass exposures to hazardous waste. 57
1. CERCLA § 9601 et seq.
Enacted in 1980, CERCLA was enacted to protect public health
by controlling hazardous waste sites and providing a path to hold
responsible parties liable for damages.58 The law authorizes two response actions either by removal, which is generally a short-term
process, or a remedial action that requires a longer-term and more
expensive response.59 CERCLA is administered by the EPA and
“grants the President broad power to command government agen54. See PFAS Action Plan: Program Update, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 20,
2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-01/documents/
pfas_action_plan_feb2020.pdf (summarizing EPA action plan regarding PFAS).
55. See id. (detailing plans laid out in news release); see also Contaminant Candidate List (CCL) and Regulatory Determination, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/ccl/regulatory-determination-4 (last visited Sept. 7, 2020) (summarizing details about list of contaminants that are national priority for water contamination cleanup efforts).
56. For a discussion of the federal statutes governing hazardous waste management, see infra notes 57-93 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of CERCLA generally, CERCLA Section 113(h), and
RCRA Section 6961(a) see infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
58. Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-comprehensive-environmental-response-compensation-andliability-act (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (summarizing purpose including brief enforcement history).
59. See Superfund: CERCLA Overview, supra note 51 (defining short-term removal actions and long-term remedial response actions).
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cies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.”60 CERCLA additionally authorizes the National Contingency Plan, which
established the EPA’s NPL and provides guidelines for responding
to hazardous waste contamination.61
2. CERCLA § 9613(h)
As litigation promptly ensued after CERCLA’s enactment, Congress chose to amend the statute to constrain the frequency of litigation in an effort to focus more heavily on cleanup efforts, as
opposed to expensive and time-consuming litigation.62 CERCLA
Section 113(h) bars litigants from bringing state claims that pose a
“challenge” to ongoing EPA cleanup efforts titled the “timing of
review.”63 Courts, however, have inconsistently applied Section
113(h) since its adoption.64 The inconsistent application of Section
113(h) is primarily due to the statute’s ambiguous language and
uncertainty of the legislative intent.65
The language of the statute is as follows: “No Federal court
shall have jurisdiction under Federal law . . . or under State law . . .
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action . . . .”66 The
phrases “no federal court,” “any challenges,” and “removal or remedial action” pose interpretive difficulties that are discernable
throughout broad and narrow readings in the applicable case law.67
In Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,68 the owner of a farm designated
as a Superfund site on the NPL brought suit against the EPA for
60. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994) (quoting
landmark recovery action case).
61. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/emergency-response/
national-oil-and-hazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-ncp-overview
(last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (establishing CERCLA’s implementation regulations as
governed by National Contingency Plan).
62. See Jonathan N. Reiter, CERCLA Section 113(h) & RCRA Citizen Suits: To Bar
or Not to Bar?, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 207, 208-09 (1999) (describing frequency of CERCLA suits and diversion from congressional intent).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1986) (defining Section 113(h) as “timing of review”); see generally Joshua J. Anderson and John E. Van Vlear, “You’re Out of Here!” CERCLA (Superfund) Federal Preemption of State Environmental Claims in State Courts,
NEWMEYER & DILLION (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=09544d26-dd24-4705-80d5-6f9196ce2a0d (explaining state claims
barred under CERCLA).
64. See Reiter, supra note 62, at 208 (discussing courts’ inconsistent application of CERCLA).
65. Id. at 210-16 (detailing ambiguous drafting and congressional intent).
66. 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (quoting language of Section 113(h)).
67. See Reiter, supra note 62, at 210-16 (explaining how different courts have
interpreted language of statute).
68. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (introducing case).
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failing to comply with its preclean-up activities.69 The district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for
failing to meet Section 113(h) timing procedures.70 The Third Circuit affirmed, opining that the statute’s clear language demonstrated Congress’s intent to limit any private actions not
enumerated by the exceptions.71
In Clinton County Commissioners v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,72 parties filed a citizen suit under CERCLA for a
trial burn and incineration remedy, claiming the toxic substances
released into the air would cause irreparable harm to local residents.73 On appeal, the Third Circuit dismissed the suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.74 Based on the plain language of the
statute, the court held that (1) citizen suits were no exception to
the jurisdictional bar and (2) removal actions were not to be
brought while remedial actions were being conducted.75 Further,
the court stated the statutory language was clear and Congress intentionally provided for a broadly-worded statute in order to protect a large scope of EPA cleanup efforts and potential dangers to
public health.76
In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry,77 a citizen’s
group brought an action for injunctive relief against the Secretary
of the Department of Defense to ensure compliance with waste-disposal environmental laws.78 In a broad reading of Section 113(h),
the Ninth Circuit interpreted “any challenges” broadly and did not
distinguish between types of plaintiffs.79 Although the court agreed
with the plaintiffs in stating “every action that increases the cost of a
cleanup or diverts resources or personnel from it does not thereby
become a ‘challenge’ to the cleanup,” it ultimately held that the
69. Id. at 1013-15 (summarizing facts of case); see also What Is Superfund?, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (defining Superfund sites as cites contaminated with hazardous
waste and explaining how CERCLA sites are informally referred to as Superfund
sites).
70. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1013 (summarizing lower court’s holding).
71. Id. at 1023 (providing Third Circuit’s holding limiting private actions).
72. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (introducing case).
73. Id. at 1021-22 (explaining facts of case).
74. Id. at 1023 (holding there was no subject matter jurisdiction).
75. Id. at 1022-25 (summarizing Third Circuit’s reasoning).
76. Id. at 1023 (expanding court’s reasoning and explanation of congressional intent).
77. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995) (introducing case).
78. Id. at 327-28 (summarizing facts of case).
79. Id. at 328-29 (explaining court’s analysis regarding what constituted “challenge” under CERCLA).
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request for injunctive relief qualified as a challenge because it directly interfered with the ongoing cleanup efforts.80
In Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle,81 a group of
residents in Washington state sued the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) seeking injunctive relief in the form
of a health surveillance program to monitor medical testing and
residents’ exposure to radioactive iodine.82 The district court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because of the Section
113(h) jurisdictional bar.83 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court, stating (1) health surveillance fell within the scope of a “removal action” under a plain language reading of the statute, and
(2) seeking injunctive relief constituted a “challenge” based on the
legislative intent.84
In 2014, the D.C. Circuit attempted to provide a clear test for
what claims fall within the Section 113(h) limitations in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States.85 In this case, a natural gas company
brought suit against the government under RCRA.86 The court analyzed other circuits’ interpretations of 113(h) in several dominant
cases and concluded with a test inspired by McClellan.87 The court
held that “a claim is a § 113(h) ‘challenge’ if it will interfere with a
‘removal’ or a ‘remedial action,’” and that it is necessary to “assess
the nexus between the nature of the suit and the CERCLA cleanup:
the more closely related, the clearer it will be that the suit is a ‘challenge’ . . . .”88 The D.C. Circuit ultimately held the plaintiffs failed
to meet the timing of review and dismissed the case without
prejudice.89

80. Id. at 330 (quoting McClellan’s argument and distinguishing its reasoning
under these facts).
81. 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction).
82. Id. at 1471-74 (summarizing facts of case).
83. Id. at 1477-80 (holding ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities to be “removal actions”).
84. Id. at 1482-83 (defining removal action under plain-language reading).
85. 750 F.3d 863 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (introducing case).
86. Id. at 871-73 (summarizing El Paso cause of action).
87. Id. at 874-81 (explaining holdings of prior case law and court’s analyses on
determining challenge).
88. Id. at 880-81 (establishing test for a “challenge”).
89. Id. at 883 (reversing lower court’s holding and dismissing without
prejudice).
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3. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §?6961
RCRA is a federal statute that provides the EPA with “the authority to control hazardous waste from the cradle to grave.”90
Under Section 6961 of RCRA, the government “expressly waives any
immunity otherwise applicable . . . with respect to any such substantive or procedural requirement . . . .”91 This waiver of immunity
includes actions for injunctive relief but excludes actions for monetary damages.92 In RCRA mass exposure cases, the issue of whether
medical monitoring constitutes injunctive or monetary relief is
common and determined on a case-by-case basis.93
C. Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act § 1115
Section 1115 of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act
(HSCA) gives citizens the power to file civil actions when their
property or person is injured due to the presence of a hazardous
substance.94 The HSCA specifically defines the terms “hazardous
substance” and “hazardous waste.”95 In Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v.
Department of the Army of the United States,96 the Third Circuit established the seven elements necessary to bring a claim under the
HSCA.97
State law claims based on the HSCA brought in federal court
are also subject to the CERCLA Section 113(h) preemption.98 In
February 2020, the Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board is90. See Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-resource-conservationand-recovery-act (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (quoting EPA scope of authority
within § 6901).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1992) (citing relevant statutory provision on sovereign immunity).
92. Id. (citing inclusions to sovereign immunity rule).
93. See e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining how monetary request is not necessarily inequitable in nature); see also Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of United States, 55 F.3d 827, 142 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding medical monitoring via trust fund was equitable remedy).
94. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.1115(a) (West 1988) (summarizing right to action under statutory provision).
95. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.103(1) (West 1988) (providing definition for
“hazardous substance”); see 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.103 (West 2018) (providing
definition and required elements for designation of “hazardous waste”).
96. 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995) (introducing case).
97. See Giovanni v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 433 F. Supp. 3d 736, 747
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d
827, 142 (3d Cir. 1995)) (listing seven elements for prima facie claim for medical
monitoring, including proven presence of “hazardous substance”).
98. Id. at 743-47 (explaining court’s reasoning for barring HSCA and other
state law claims under CERCLA).
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sued a notice to amend Pennsylvania state law to include PFAS as
“hazardous substances” granting future plaintiffs the ability to recover under the HSCA.99
IV. SLIPPIN’ UNDER - SECTION 113(H) AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
In Giovanni, the Third Circuit separately scrutinized the two
main issues plaguing the case: (1) the CERCLA Section 113(h) jurisdictional bar, and (2) sovereign immunity.100 This section includes the Third Circuit’s analysis of what constitutes a challenge
under Section 113(h), analyzes the subtleties of removal and remedial actions, and discusses ongoing cleanup efforts.101 This section
also includes the concurrence’s analysis and the issues ultimately
remanded to the lower district court.102
A. Lack of Jurisdiction Over “Challenges” Under Section 113(h)
In Giovanni, the Third Circuit analyzed case law to determine
what constitutes a “challenge” under Section 113(h) of CERCLA,
and whether the claims in the present matter fell within that scope
by interfering with ongoing EPA cleanup efforts.103 The court additionally reiterated the interpretive complexities and legislative intent behind CERCLA.104 The interpretive complexities focused on
identifying what kind of party could bring forth an action and finding the intended definition for “removal” and “remedial” actions.105 The court also discussed the benefits of barring state
claims under Section 113(h) and how requiring additional responses was inappropriate.106 The court noted, as Boarhead prescribed, that Section 113(h) precludes a state claim from
jurisdiction if the claim clearly “delay[s] or interfere[s] with EPA
99. 50 Pa. Bull. 1011 (Feb. 15, 2020) (proposing amendment to 25 PA. CODE
§ 250.11).
100. Giovanni v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 906 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing court’s opinion).
101. For a discussion of the majority’s analysis, see infra notes 103-41 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of the concurrence and the issues on remand, see infra
notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
103. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 102-03 (explaining court’s dissection of parties’
first argument regarding lack of jurisdiction).
104. Id. at 109-10 (expressing why Congress adopted Section 113(h) of
CERCLA).
105. Id. (summarizing court’s interpretive challenges).
106. Id. at 113-14 (outlining Congressional intent and reasons for reducing
government cleanup effort burdens).
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cleanup activities.”107 The court ultimately held that private party
medical monitoring does not constitute a challenge under Section
113(h), but a health assessment does.108
1. CERCLA Removal and Remedial Actions
In order to determine whether Section 113(h) barred the
plaintiffs’ claim in Giovanni, the court first analyzed whether private
party medical monitoring or health assessments, as requests for relief, fit the statutory definitions for “removal” or “remedial” actions.109 The Third Circuit evaluated this question by examining
the plain language definitions in the statute, scrutinized through
the lens of prior case law interpretations.110
a. Private Party Medical Monitoring
The court assessed that even though the statutory definition
uses the word “monitor,” it did not do so in the context of “monitoring of individuals for latent diseases or injuries.”111 As for remedial actions, the court rationalized that, although medical
monitoring closely mirrored a permanent remedy, it was not an example of a claim that attempted to “minimize the release of hazardous substances.”112
The court also determined that there was no supporting case
law that classified private party medical monitoring as a remedial
action.113 To support its reasoning, the Third Circuit applied the
persuasive analysis from the Ninth Circuit’s Hanford decision, which
distinguished between private party medical monitoring activities
and government-led health surveillance activities.114 In applying
107. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 103 (quoting Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d
1011, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)) (explaining basis for jurisdictional bar under CERCLA
Section 113(h)).
108. Id. at 115 (concluding plaintiffs could pursue medical monitoring but
not health assessments).
109. Id. at 104 (quoting precise definition for “removal action” from 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23)); see id. at 104-05 (quoting precise definition for “remedial action” from 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)).
110. Id. at 106-07 (summarizing court’s analysis of what constitutes removal or
remedial actions).
111. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 106 (distinguishing text of statute from removal
action through plain language definition).
112. Id. at 106-07 (differentiating medical monitoring from plain language
definition for remedial action).
113. Id. (summarizing why courts do not consider private party medical monitoring remedial action).
114. Id. at 108-10 (citing Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71
F.3d 1469, 1475-82 (9th Cir. 1995)) (using Hanford court’s analysis to distinguish
how medical monitoring falls outside of scope for claims that Section 113(h) bars).
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the Hanford standard, the court rationalized that “[p]rivate party
medical monitoring falls outside of the definition of response action, but government-led monitoring does not.”115 As this was a
question of private party medical monitoring rather than a request
for government health surveillance, the court reasoned private
party medical monitoring did not fit the statutory definition under
Section 113(h) and was not a removal or remedial action.116
b. Health Assessment or Health Effects Study
The Third Circuit held that government-led health assessments, unlike private party medical monitoring, pose a challenge
under Section 113(h).117 The court reasoned that while a generic
health study — like private party medical monitoring — would not
generally trigger removal or remedial actions under Section
113(h), requesting that the Navy conduct health assessments interfered with the government response action under CERCLA.118 The
government maintains the authority to conduct health assessments
as part of the cleanup efforts for NPL sites.119 The court reasoned
that imposing an additional duty and its related costs served as a
challenge to ongoing cleanup efforts under Section 113(h).120
2. Ongoing Federal Cleanup Efforts
The court doubled down on its argument by venturing beyond
the plain language of the statute, and evaluating whether there
were additional reasons to believe the plaintiffs’ request interfered
with ongoing cleanup efforts.121 This subsection covers the distinctions between private party medical monitoring and health assessments as forms of requested relief.122
115. Id. at 109 (adopting Hanford standard as persuasive because private party
medical monitoring is not government-led).
116. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 110 (using Hanford standard to justify permissibility under CERCLA Section 113(h)).
117. Id. (distinguishing between medical monitoring and health
assessments).
118. Id. (explaining how plaintiffs are seeking government-led assessment as
opposed to assessment led by private party, creating CERCLA challenge).
119. Id. at 110-11 (explaining ongoing cleanup efforts).
120. Id. (explaining issues with imposing additional duties).
121. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 113 (summarizing additional considerations barring claims under Section 113(h)).
122. For a discussion of private party medical monitoring and health assessments, see infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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a. Private Party Medical Monitoring
The court held that although the use of government funds to
address medical monitoring was inevitable, this was not sufficient to
conflict with ongoing cleanup efforts.123 This conclusion was distinct from the lower court’s reasoning.124 The Third Circuit held
that the lower court’s reliance on Boarhead was misplaced because
the facts were distinct and the argument was unsupported.125 The
Boarhead plaintiff directly interfered with ongoing cleanup efforts
by seeking injunctive relief that would change EPA remedial
plans.126
Comparatively, the plaintiffs in Giovanni sought a trust solely to
cover the cost of their own medical monitoring.127 Rather than directly requesting that the government take new or diverted actions,
the plaintiffs in Giovanni sought relief in the form of a trust based
on the undisputed existence of PFOA and PFOS released by the
Navy.128 The court noted that the undisputed existence of PFOA
and PFOS was of key importance because any uncertainty surrounding the request would burden ongoing cleanup efforts.129
b. Health Assessment or Health Effects Study
Although the private party medical monitoring passed the Section 113(h) “challenge” test, the court deemed that the health assessment failed the test because it impacted and interfered with
cleanup efforts under El Paso and McClellan.130 The court reasoned
that the requested relief required additional work on behalf of the
government and, further, “preempt[ed] the federal government’s
‘ability to choose the best remedial action among a panoply of re123. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 113 (explaining private party medical monitoring meets Section 113(h) bar).
124. Id. at 113-14 (citing Giovanni v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 263 F. Supp. 3d 532
(E.D. Pa. 2017)) (noting how district court relied heavily on precedent stating that
delays or disputes about costs are counter to Congressional intent to move expeditiously and cost-effectively).
125. Id. at 114 (citing Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019-23 (3d
Cir. 1991)) (distinguishing Giovanni from Boarhead).
126. Id. (citing Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019-23 (3d Cir.
1991)) (summarizing factual and legal differences in Boarhead).
127. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 113-14 (highlighting factual and legal differences in Giovanni).
128. Id. at 114 (clarifying distinction between forms of relief sought).
129. Id. (reiterating significance of PFOA and PFOS’ uncontended presence
in minimizing potential costs hindering cleanup efforts).
130. Id. at 114-15 (summarizing added challenges to Section 113(h) for
health assessments request).
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medial alternatives . . . .’”131 This concept of preempting the government’s ability to choose arose directly from the El Paso analysis
of McClellan, which similarly held there was no jurisdiction under
Section 113(h).132
B. Sovereign Immunity
The court then analyzed the second issue that the Navy argued: whether the government’s sovereign immunity barred the
claim if the plaintiffs succeeded on their claim for jurisdiction
under Section 113(h).133 The court found the plaintiffs’ counterargument to be more persuasive based on an analysis of the plain
language of RCRA Section 6961(a) and prior case law, categorizing
the distinctions between state law claims for injunctive versus monetary relief.134 The court began its analysis with RCRA Section
6961(a), which specifically carves out that sovereign immunity is
waived where there is a claim for injunctive relief.135 The court
then analyzed whether the medical monitoring claim was more
analogous to monetary damages or to injunctive relief, noting that
medical monitoring claims are subject to a case-specific analysis.136
The court relied on Jaffee v. United States137 to establish that a request for an expense or payment of money does not immediately
disqualify such a request from the “category of equitable remedies.”138 For its case-specific analysis, the court relied heavily on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Redland opinion, which dealt with a
similar request for relief for private party medical monitoring in the
131. Id. at 115 (quoting El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. U.S., 750 F.3d 863, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 2014)) (referencing government’s added burden if court granted requested
relief).
132. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 115 (using elements from El Paso to address
concerns for preempting ongoing cleanup efforts); see also El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v.
U.S., 750 F.3d 863, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995)) (referencing additional requests for
relief that impose on government efforts).
133. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 117 (summarizing defendants’ argument for
sovereign immunity).
134. Id. at 118 (summarizing plaintiffs’ argument regarding RCRA Section
6961(a) and prior case law).
135. Id. (referencing plain language of RCRA Section 6961(a)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 6961(a) (explaining when sovereign immunity is waived or applied).
136. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 119 (reviewing case law comparing monetary
damages and injunctive or equitable relief).
137. 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding plaintiff’s request for injunction ordering payment of money does not transform damages claim into equitable
remedy).
138. Giovanni, 906 F.3d 94 at 119 (quoting Jaffee v. U.S., 592 F.2d 712, 715
(3d Cir. 1979)) (noting distinctions made in Jaffee for equitable remedies).
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form of a trust fund.139 Drawing on this precedent, the court concluded that the medical monitoring claims under the HSCA were
primarily equitable in nature.140 The court held the claims were
more akin to injunctive relief than to a request for money damages,
which compelled a waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to RCRA
Section 6961(a).141
C. Judge Bibas’s Concurrence
Circuit Judge Bibas concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment.142 He agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the
sovereign immunity waiver under RCRA Section 6961(a) but disagreed with its analysis regarding jurisdiction under Section
113(h).143 Rather than adopting the Hanford standard, Judge Bibas
believed the majority should have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s standard from El Paso.144 The El Paso standard synthesized all the preexisting tests for determining challenges to removal or remedial
actions into one “interference test.” 145 Under the El Paso standard,
Judge Bibas proposed that neither private party medical monitoring nor health assessments posed a challenge to Section 113(h) because neither interfered with any response action.146 Judge Bibas
distilled his argument in favor of the “interference test,” stating that
Section 113(h) “turns on whether the action would interfere with a
removal or remedial action, not whether the actor is the government.”147 While Judge Bibas did not believe either medical monitoring or health assessments constituted challenges to Section
113(h), he declined to address the question of sovereign immunity
regarding health assessments and agreed with the majority’s remand to state court.148
139. Id. (citing Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dept. of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d
827 (3d Cir. 1995)) (noting Jaffee’s distinctions for equitable remedies).
140. Id. at 120-21 (explaining similarities between Giovanni and precedent to
distinguish types of equitable remedies).
141. Id. (holding sovereign immunity is waived for medical monitoring).
142. Id. at 121 (concurring in part).
143. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 121 (summarizing agreement and distinctions from
majority opinion).
144. Id. (finding Hanford’s analysis unpersuasive for current case).
145. Id. (referencing “interference test” from El Paso and applicability for current case); see also El Paso Natural Gas, 750 F.3d at 880 (summarizing “interference
test”).
146. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 121-22 (synthesizing “interference test” for private
party medical monitoring and health assessments).
147. Id. at 123 (distilling “interference test” into simple analysis that disrupts
majority’s construction).
148. Id. (declining to answer question of sovereign immunity).
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D. Lower Court Remand Decision
On remand to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court
agreed with the Third Circuit that the Navy waived sovereign immunity with respect to the private party medical monitoring.149 The
court reasoned that had it not been for HSCA limitations, the Navy
could have been held liable for the requested relief.150 The court
reiterated the circuit court’s sovereign immunity argument under
RCRA and explained HSCA’s limitations on recovery.151 Judge
Pappert, however, notably remarked that Pennsylvania does not
classify PFOS or PFOA as hazardous substances under the HSCA,
meaning the plaintiffs were not able to state a claim for relief under
current Pennsylvania law.152
V. THE MAJORITY SPINNIN’ ‘ROUND AND ‘ROUND: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE GIOVANNI MAJORITY OPINION
While the majority’s analysis of what constitutes a challenge
under Section 113(h) adheres to precedent and is logically consistent, Judge Bibas’s concurrence summarizes the majority’s lengthy
and exhaustive argument in a succinct three pages.153 The concurring opinion solely relies on a preexisting synthesized test combining elements from prior precedent, which the majority merely
referenced in a complimentary footnote to its otherwise holistic approach.154 Without directly identifying its use of the “interference
test” from El Paso, the majority essentially repeats the El Paso analysis in distinguishing removal and remedial actions for the government-led health assessments and medical monitoring.155 For Judge
Bibas, the only important question is whether the response action
interferes with ongoing cleanup efforts.156 The question of
whether a response action obstructs or hinders the cleanup efforts
149. Giovanni v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 433 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742-43 (E.D. Pa.
2020) (summarizing basis for remand and holding).
150. Id. (highlighting HSCA’s limitations).
151. Id. at 742-47 (arguing consistency with Third Circuit for sovereign immunity claim and limitations under HSCA).
152. Id. at 747 (holding court’s statutory limitations in providing plaintiffs
with opportunities to recover under HSCA).
153. For a discussion of the majority’s analysis and the concurrence, see supra
notes 100-48 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the concurrence, see supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the “interference test,” see supra notes 145-47 and
accompanying text; see also supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of El Paso.
156. For a discussion of the concurrence, see supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
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appears to be a straightforward one to answer.157 Given that legislative intent behind Section 113(h) is to avoid delaying ongoing
cleanup efforts, the court ought to rely on what kind of action
would cause a delay as the crux of the test, as opposed to looking at
the actor or other metrics.158 If the action would not cause a delay
or a prohibitive cost, it is not an interference and, therefore, not a
challenge under Section 113(h).159 The majority’s interpretation
reached a similar conclusion but focused on the less important trigger for the test.160 Like many court opinions before Giovanni, the
majority’s analysis was likely due to the perceived ambiguity in the
drafting of the statutory definitions.161
The majority’s argument also heavily hinges on the purported
ongoing efforts to clean up the Naval Station.162 While the court
has no duty to enforce ongoing cleanup efforts, ignoring the fact
that the Naval Station had been on the NPL since 1995 — without
any semblance of resolve — muddied the effectiveness of the majority’s argument and undermined the legislative intent.163 Although the Third Circuit’s holding was proper in light of
precedent, Judge Bibas’s concurrence provided a simpler approach
to the same conclusion and offered a clearer construction than the
majority.164
Like the majority, however, the concurrence is faulted where it
declines to address the issue of whether sovereign immunity is
waived regarding health assessments.165 The majority ignored this
question as it already reasoned that health assessments are barred
157. See Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 122 (citing ordinary meanings to simplify future
Section 113(h) interpretation); see also Reiter, supra note 62, at 208-16 (discussing
inconsistency with court interpretation because of ambiguous drafting and efforts
to establish standard).
158. See Reiter, supra note 62, at 208-09 (discussing legislative intent for Section 113(h) amendment to restrict future litigation).
159. For a discussion of the El Paso “interference test,” see supra notes 130-33
and accompanying text.
160. For the concurrence’s application of the El Paso “interference test,” see
supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
161. See Reiter, supra note 62, at 208 (discussing courts’ inconsistent applications of Section 113(h) due to alleged ambiguity).
162. For the majority’s discussion on the impact of ongoing cleanup efforts,
see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
163. See Superfund: CERCLA Overview, supra note 51 (discussing role of EPA
and NPL in addressing ongoing cleanup efforts); see also EPA Actions to Address
PFAS, supra note 33 (discussing lack of ongoing cleanup efforts at Naval Station).
164. Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 121-23 (Bibas, J., concurring) (distinguishing from
majority in concise manner).
165. Id. at 121, 123 (explaining failure to address sovereign immunity).
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under Section 113(h).166 In contrast, the concurrence claimed Section 113(h) should not bar health assessments, but it failed to conclude whether health assessments are a form of permissible
equitable injunctive relief or a prohibited request for money
damages.167
Finally, irrespective of CERCLA jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, this case’s ping-ponging between state and federal courts
raises questions of judicial efficiency and economy.168 The case
originated in state court, claiming a violation under Pennsylvania
law.169 At the time of filing, no suitable recovery response existed
for plaintiffs because HSCA’s designations of hazardous waste omitted PFOS and PFOA.170 Further, the case’s course from state court,
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to the Third Circuit, and
back again — with a final disposition that the plaintiffs could not
recover under Pennsylvania law — calls into question the court system’s discernment in letting the initial meritless claim proceed.171
While the initial removal by the Navy was procedurally proper, the
plaintiffs’ claim for relief hinged on an issue of Pennsylvania state
law.172 Irrespective of whether this amounted to a challenge under
Section 113(h), plaintiffs would still have no modality for relief or
recovery because PFAS are not federally regulated nor are they designated as hazardous waste under Pennsylvania law.173
VI. THERE’S NO ESCAPE, IT CAN’T WAIT: QUESTIONING THE
FUTURE OF EPA CLEANUP EFFORTS AND PFAS HAZARDOUS
WASTE DESIGNATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
The ultimate value in examining a case like Giovanni is evaluating the efficacy of CERCLA Section 113(h) in limiting federal hazardous waste claims and battling the limitations of procedure for
166. See id. at 121 (holding statutory language precludes health assessment
form of relief).
167. Id. at 121-23 (failing to determine whether health assessments are equitable or monetary damages).
168. See Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 100-01 (providing procedural background of
case).
169. See id. at 100 (detailing state law claim).
170. For a discussion of hazardous waste designation under the HSCA, see
supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
171. See Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 100-01 (detailing circuitous route case took
before final disposition).
172. Id. (discussing Navy’s removal to federal district court).
173. For a discussion of hazardous waste designation under the HSCA, see
supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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environmental claims.174 This section further assesses the potential
for judicial economy and highlights the positive role of judicial activism in environmental law.175 This section concludes by exploring
recent attempts to revise or promulgate new PFAS regulations and
illustrates a new focus on protecting individuals from adverse
health effects caused by PFAS exposure.176
As discussed in Section III of this Note, Congress enacted CERCLA to clean up hazardous waste sites across the United States that
pose a significant environmental and public health threat.177 In
1986, Congress amended CERCLA with Section 113(h) to shift
costs incurred from frequent hazardous waste claims to cleanup efforts.178 If the overarching intent of CERCLA is to address major
environmental and public health concerns, yet parties may be
barred from bringing subsequent claims even if the ongoing
cleanup efforts amplify or ignore other persistent environmental or
public health harms, the statute’s efficacy is dubious.179 As illustrated in Giovanni — where there was little evidence of improvement to the Naval Station’s environmental status despite ongoing
cleanup efforts dating back to 1995 — barring the plaintiffs from
receiving government-led health assessments could result in more
significant contamination and exacerbate public health concerns.180 With over one thousand sites listed on the NPL, there are
undoubtedly other instances where Section 113(h) may inhibit
meritorious claims from being brought, resulting in foreseeable adverse effects.181 Not only does Section 113(h) deter the well-intentioned plaintiff from bringing suit for relief against the

174. For a discussion of the development of CERCLA and the legislative intent, see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of judicial economy and judicial activism, see infra notes
190-94 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of recent updates on PFAS regulations, see infra notes
195-203 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the adoption of CERCLA, see supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of cleanup efforts to the Naval Station, see supra notes
21-27 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of barriers to litigation under CERCLA, see supra notes
62-89 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the dangers of PFAS, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of
ongoing cleanup efforts to the Naval Station.
181. For a discussion of the National Priorities List, see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
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government, it also limits injured plaintiffs to a very narrow realm
of equitable relief.182
Also highlighted in Section V of this Note is the ineffectiveness
of the state court in its initial assessment of the hazardous waste
issue.183 Had more attention been brought to the HSCA designations for hazardous waste, the more complex issues of CERCLA jurisdiction and sovereign immunity would have likely never broken
the surface.184 While the Third Circuit does not address — nor is it
supposed to address — the HSCA claim, it is ironic that after more
than four years of contentious and costly litigation on other substantive legal issues, on remand the plaintiff’s outcome is reduced
to whether or not PFOS and PFOA are designated as hazardous
waste in Pennsylvania.185 In light of Section 113(h)’s legislative intent, which is to reduce litigation and ensure all efforts are directed
to cleanup, there is an inherent flaw in the outcome.186 The time
and money that could have been spent on addressing PFAS contamination, or other hazardous waste at the Naval Station, was instead
spent on four years of costly litigation.187 While there is no precise
way to weigh the costs and benefits of Section 113(h) litigation
against providing the requested medical monitoring and health assessments, it is likely that the expense of this litigation caused a significant disruption to ongoing cleanup efforts.188 If the precise
statute adopted to curb CERCLA litigation is a direct cause of more
confusion and leads to more litigation, legislators and courts must
question the efficacy of such a statute.189
Furthermore, on remand to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge Pappert commented: “[t]he inherent vagaries of the
legislative or regulatory processes aside, the issue is not whether
someone in Harrisburg or Washington may someday mold the law
182. For the court’s analysis of what constitutes equitable relief under Section
113(h), see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
183. See Giovanni, 906 F.3d at 100 (discussing state claim for relief).
184. For a discussion of the HSCA and hazardous waste, see supra notes 94-99
and accompanying text; see also supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case’s procedural history.
185. For a discussion of the district court’s holding on remand, see supra
notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of legislative intent behind Section 113(h), see supra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of the case history, see supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of the court’s analysis of plaintiffs’ claim for medical
monitoring and health assessments, see supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of Section 113(h) interpretative confusion and history
of litigation, see supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
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to Plaintiffs’ current theory. The issue is whether the Plaintiffs can
state a claim for relief under the current law . . . .”190 Judge Pappert
noted the significant gap in Pennsylvania law and, in an admirable
bid of activism, called on state and federal legislators to designate
PFAS as hazardous substances.191 The Giovanni case revolved
around concerns for the public health of Montgomery County residents.192 Judge Pappert may have been sympathetic to the community’s concerns but was restricted by existing law.193 Calling on
legislators in Harrisburg and Washington D.C. was an attempt to
assist future, similarly-situated plaintiffs in seeking recovery and
relief.194
Although the outcome of Giovanni was not inherently
favorable to the plaintiffs, the resulting impact of public attention,
and subsequently the attention of local and federal government,
shed a much-needed light on the unintended pitfalls of CERCLA
Section 113(h).195 As a positive outcome from the case, the EPA
issued a news release on February 20, 2020 as part of its PFAS Action Plan to implement regulatory determinations for PFOS and
PFOA.196 The EPA’s new plan includes (1) banning manufacturing
and importation of PFAS, (2) implementing new testing procedures for PFAS, and (3) issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking to
add PFOS and PFOA to the Contaminant Candidate List.197
At the state level, beginning in fall 2020, Pennsylvania and federal health officials planned to recruit one thousand adults and
three hundred children in Bucks and Montgomery Counties for a
national study on the impacts of PFAS on thyroid function, cholesterol levels, kidney function, the immune systems, liver function,
and even behavioral problems.198 As of February 15, 2020, the
190. Giovanni v. United States Dept. of the Navy, 433 F. Supp. 3d 736, 747
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding court’s statutory limitations in providing plaintiffs with
opportunities to recover under HSCA).
191. Id. (concluding plaintiffs could not seek requested relief unless there
were changes to state or federal law).
192. For a discussion of facts leading up to plaintiffs’ complaint, see supra
notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
193. 433 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (summarizing restrictions to current state law).
194. Id. (noting Pappert’s call for legislators to change law for future
plaintiffs).
195. For a discussion of resulting public attention, see infra notes 198-203 and
accompanying text.
196. See EPA Actions to Address PFAS, supra note 53 (describing issuance of EPA
news release to address PFAS).
197. See PFAS Action Plan: Program Update, supra note 54 (summarizing details
of PFAS Action Plan).
198. See Kummer, supra note 10 (explaining planned study to monitor PA residents for adverse health effects from PFAS exposure).
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Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board proposed to amend 25
Pa. Code Section 250.11, which would add PFAS to the list of contaminants and create a maximum threshold for permissible consumption.199 The proposed rulemaking would add mediumspecific concentrations for three types of PFAS, two of which were
included in the Giovanni case.200 The proposed rulemaking is a
preliminary step toward categorizing PFAS as hazardous waste
under Pennsylvania law.201 This change would allow future claimants, like the Giovannis or Palmers, to bring suit in Pennsylvania
state court.202 Although the Pennsylvania Bulletin did not directly
link the proposed rulemaking to Giovanni, the rulemaking was notably proposed just one month after the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided the case.203
Stephanie J. Oppenheim*
199. 50 Pa. Bull. 1011 (Feb. 15, 2020) (citing amendment of PA statute).
200. Id. (noting effect of amended statute by adopting PFAS as hazardous
substances).
201. For a discussion of the district court’s holding on remand, see supra
notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
202. 50 Pa. Bull. 1011 (Feb. 15, 2020) (citing amendment of PA statute).
203. Id. (noting date of proposed rulemaking as January 15, 2020).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
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Spears for being an unintended environmentalist icon and bringing some levity to
an otherwise troubling topic.
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